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Abstract
With the ever growing Internet of Things (IoT) market,
ledger systems are facing new challenges to efficiently store
and secure enormous customer records collected by the IoT
devices. The authenticity, availability, and integrity of these
records are critically important for both business providers
and customers. In this paper, we describe DLedger, a
lightweight and resilient distributed ledger system. Instead
of a single chain of blocks, DLedger builds the ledger over
a directed acyclic graph (DAG), so that its operations can
tolerate network partition and intermittent connectivity. In-
stead of compute-intensive Proof-of-Work (PoW), DLedger
utilizes Proof-of-Authentication (PoA), whose light-weight
operations are IoT-friendly, to achieve consensus. Further-
more, DLedger is built upon a data-centric network called
Named Data Networking (NDN), which facilitates the peer-
to-peer data dissemination in heterogeneous IoT networks.
1 Introduction
In modern business networks, a ledger is of vital importance
to keep the customers’ data and ensure steadiness of business
functions. According to [11], by 2020, the number of phys-
ical objects in IoT market will reach 50 billion, imposing
higher requirements on ledger systems to offer better secu-
rity of data on a massive scale and be more IoT-friendly.
Today’s IoT industry commonly makes use of centralized
ledger systems. Our work is inspired by an experimental
private solar system [33] where the customer energy pro-
duction/consumption records measured by the rooftop solar
gateways were kept on a cloud server for logging. These
records will later be quoted by the business service provider
to bill its customers. However, since a centralized ledger is
governed solely by the service provider, this approach is of-
ten maligned by customers as well as other financial parties
involved in business systems for the following two reasons.
First, the business service provider who controls the server
may tamper customer records to obtain unfair advantage. For
example, the solar system service provider may alter the en-
ergy usage data to maliciously charge customers who can’t
prove the existence of original recording data. Even worse,
today, there is little surveillance of such corruption. Second,
cloud server outages and unstable IoT network connectivity
could also probably ruin the data availability.
To overcome the drawbacks brought by the centralized so-
lutions, many business providers now pay attention to the
blockchain-based distributed ledger system. However, pop-
ular distributed ledgers used in cryptocurrencies, such as Bit-
coin [20] and Ethereum [10], and other use cases, are not
suitable for private IoT business for a number of reasons.
(i) These systems use various resource-intensive gating func-
tions (e.g., proof-of-work, proof-of-stake), which are essen-
tially not acceptable for constrained devices and inefficient
for system with massive scale of real-time records. (ii) The
widely-used blockchain data structure does not suffice with
unstable network conditions. For example, it is hard for a
subnet’s blockchain to be integrated into the main chain af-
ter a network partition. (iii) Moreover, data dissemination
and synchronization required by the peer-to-peer (P2P) net-
work often has a low efficiency due to the heterogeneous
IoT network. For example, when peers are trying to fetch
the missing data in the ledger from the original producer,
this producer device could be in sleeping mode and thus not
reachable.
In this paper, we present DLedger, an IoT-friendly dis-
tributed ledger system designed for private business net-
works. Being data-centric, we build our ledger system over
Named Data Networking (NDN) [31], which is deployable
in a private system. The goal of DLedger is to provide a
secure and highly available ledger to keep permanent and
immutable data in business contexts. Throughout DLedger,
entities cannot deny or dispute the validity, existence or the
ownership of recorded data, thus ensuring the normal busi-
ness functions. Addressing the aforementioned challenges,
DLedger delivers its design in terms of four main compo-
nents:
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• Records in DLedger are kept in a Directed Acyclic Graph
(DAG) instead of a single blockchain, allowing simple
ledger integration after network partition.
• DLedger utilizes a compute-efficient gating function
called Proof-of-Authentication (PoA), leading to the suf-
ficiency for constrained devices to work. Moreover,
DLedger provides archiving mechanisms for system par-
ticipants to reduce the size of their local ledgers.
• To ensure the robustness of DLedger and prevent potential
abuse and attack scenarios, we also propose a set of secu-
rity policies, providing a (k,N) k < N threshold scheme
where unless more than k peers of the total N peers get
compromised, the system remains secured.
• DLedger leverages NDN to achieve effective data dis-
semination by providing built-in content multicast and re-
silient data availability. Moreover, NDN helps to reduce
DLedger’s implementation complexity as well.
We have implemented a prototype of DLedger and evalu-
ate our system with both theoretical analysis and simulation
results. Our results show that DLedger is of good scalabil-
ity and robustness, with the ability to mitigate various at-
tack scenarios and potential vulnerabilities. Throughout the
paper, we want to show the power of distributed ledgers to
achieving security by combining data openness with verifi-
able identities.
Organization In the rest of the paper, we introduce the re-
lated work and key challenges in Section 2 and present the
design overview of DLedger in Section 3. Section 4 de-
scribes DLedger’s ledger design, explaining how DAG, PoW
and security policies work together to provide data secu-
rity. Section 5 talks about DLedger’s network design. We
assess DLedger system’s security in Section 6 and evaluate
DLedger in Section 7 We have some discussion about the
design in Section 8 and conclude our work in Section 9.
2 Motivation
2.1 Related Work
Bitcoin [20] and Ethereum [10] are two typical and success-
ful examples of distributed ledger systems. Both are based
on blockchain where transactions are kept in blocks and all
the blocks are chained together by hash pointers. To de-
cide who can add the next valid block in the blockchain,
miners compete the chance by outpacing each other with
higher computation power, leading to immense energy waste
because it only allows one game winner and voids all the
work done by others. Another well-known consensus al-
gorithm is Proof-of-Stake (PoS), in which users win the
chance of adding the next block by putting their holdings
at stake. Many other algorithms are also proposed; for
example, [8, 23] propose the Proof-of-Space where peers
compete by allocating a non-trivial amount of memory and
[2] presents Proof-of-Activity which combines the PoW and
PoS. A cryptocurrency who claims to be IoT-friendly called
IOTW [1] proposes a Proof-of-Assignment protocol over the
blockchain, where the mining is more lightweight and af-
fordable for IoT devices. In Proof-of-Assignment, a miner
will be selected in two ways. (i) A centralized server ran-
domly pick up an IoT device. (ii) Each device use their own
key and predefined seed to calculate a randomness. A ran-
domness with specific format (e.g., characteristics of n least
significant bits) will be selected.
Blockchain has also gained much attention in other use
cases [5, 35]. As an example, researchers from MIT
have developed a decentralized computation platform called
Enigma [36], where a blockchain is maintained between
users and service providers to store the access policies to
personal data, acting as an access-control moderator. To ap-
pend new blocks, Enigma uses a Proof-of-Stake (PoS) model
for worker selection [9]. Many other works [27, 32, 12, 28]
leverage the unused bytes of the transactions in Bitcoin or
Ethereum for their own purposes. In IoT use cases, for ex-
ample, [7] establishes a distributed trust model employing
Beta Reputation System [15] over blockchain in their pri-
vate smart home devices network, and [30] proposes an IoT
framework based on blockchain and Proof-of-Space. Be-
sides the distributed ledger systems over TCP/IP, few related
works [14, 17] that are NDN/ICN-based were published as
well. For example, [14] presents a Bitcoin-like blockchain
system over NDN called BlockNDN.
Specifically, we identify the works of IOTA [13],
Nano [21], and Byteball [4], which are graph-based dis-
tributed ledger systems. IOTA [13] is a cryptocurrency sys-
tem which claims to be IoT friendly given its feeless transac-
tion and lightweight PoW. IOTA’s distributed ledger is built
upon an underlying data structure called tangle [24], de-
rived from Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG). Each node in
the tangle is a block carrying the transactions made with
IOTA coins, and similar to chained blocks in blockchain,
blocks are also associated by hash references. IOTA allows
each system participant to append new blocks by verifying
two existing blocks and doing a lightweight PoW. To select
blocks to approve, IOTA utilizes a weighted random select-
ing algorithm called Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC)
to walk from ancient blocks towards the latest ones. Once a
record has been referred by enough blocks, it is considered
that the system has achieved the consensus on this record.
IOTA utilizes tangle and thus allows multiple transaction to
be processed in parallel, vastly improving the system capac-
ity compared with blockchain-based systems. Nano [21] and
Byteball [4] are also cryptocurrencies utilizing graph-based
ledgers. Nano, similar to IOTA, uses PoW as anti-spam pro-
tection while Byteball gets rid of PoW and achieves consen-
sus by forming a single chain called “main chain” within the
graph. This main chain consists of the blocks selected by
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trusted third-party users.
2.2 Observations and Key Challenges
As observed, most consensus protocols are relying on sys-
tem participants’ resources (power of calculation or storing),
which is incompatible with the constrained resources of con-
straint IoT devices due to “no muscle to show”. Conse-
quently, instead of directly participating in the ledger sys-
tem, IoT devices need to wait for powerful miners to add
their transactions into the blockchain. Among the protocols,
Proof-of-Assignment [1] seems to be IoT-friendly. How-
ever, the first minor selection method relies on the central
server, potentially leading to service provider’s malicious in-
tervention and single-point-of-failure, while the second se-
lection method can easily be compromised because attackers
can simply hire computation power (not too much because
IOTW’s mining is so lightweight) and work out a random-
ness to win the selection.
Moreover, the single blockchain structure is not IoT-
friendly as well for the following reasons. First, it limits
the system capacity because there is always only one next
record, forbidding the parallel efforts. Bitcoin is such an ex-
ample where each block takes about 10 minutes to be ap-
pended into the chain and the maximum throughput is 3.3–
7 transactions/sec [6]. Also, in case of network partition,
each subnet will keep appending new blocks to their view of
chain, thus leading to two different versions of blockchains
that are not compatible.
Compared with blockchain-based systems, IOTA utilizes
tangle and thus allows multiple transaction to be processed
in parallel, vastly improving the system capacity. However,
IOTA is not suitable as a distributed ledger in IoT network as
well. On the one hand, IOTA’s lightweight PoW is still heavy
for constrained IoT devices because it can take minutes to
compute one PoW, potentially influencing the normal IoT
functions. On the other hand, since a miner is anonymous
to the system, it can secretly lease out PoW computation to
the modern computers for whom PoW is not so resource-
consuming, thus able to append many blocks to the system
in a short time. This allows them to not only make self-
approvals where a peer can keep referring one’s own (even
invalid) blocks but also make system accept them by control-
ling all the tips. Moreover, since the hash pointers are made
from newer blocks to old blocks while MCMC requires the
random walk from old to new, it leads to inefficiency because
finding successive blocks is non-trivial. In the worst case, a
peer even needs to iterate the whole graph for each step.
Other graph-based distributed ledgers are also not suit-
able as a private ledger used in IoT. For example, in Nano,
the PoW could be computed in order of seconds by modern
computers, thus the system may subject to transaction flood-
ing when attackers are with computation power. Regarding
Byteball, though based on graph, the consensus of data is
still in a singe chain, which is insufficient in network par-
tition. Byteball argues that the network partition is almost
impossible in the public Internet, but in IoT network, this
assumption does not hold anymore.
Therefore, designing a distributed ledger system for IoT
business model requires changing in both ledger design and
network design. In particular, we identify three main chal-
lenges to address in our work.
1. Providing robust ledger whose data consensus is re-
silient to unstable IoT network conditions. In the case of
network partition or intermittent connectivity, entities from
different subnets should still be able to contribute to the
ledger system. After network failure, the distributed ledger
can quickly recover from the partition by aggregating the
data generated by different subnets.
2. Working with constrained capacity of IoT devices
and the massive scale of data. The distributed ledger should
be efficient enough for constrained devices to append their
own data and at the same time, preventing the potential abuse
and attack scenarios.
3. Filling the gap between inefficient data dissemina-
tion in IoT and the high data throughput required by the
P2P network. The ledger should support efficient data dis-
semination for the routine synchronization among peers.
3 DLedger Design Overview
Goals and Design Decisions DLedger aims to keep non-
repudiable and permanent records in a distributed ledger sys-
tem that can work with resource-constrained IoT devices.
To achieve the goal and address the challenges identified,
DLedger takes four design decisions:
• DLedger utilizes DAG to keep the recording data.
• DLedger uses PoA as the gating function to allow entities
adding new records.
• DLedger ensures system robustness by a set of security
policies.
• DLedger is built over a data-centric network.
Assumptions In DLedger, each entity is a valid customer
node, or a device deployed by the business provider or part-
ners involved who are authorized to access the records. Our
distributed ledger system is based on the underlying assump-
tion that entities in the private system have established the
trust relationship with the help of the identity manager de-
ployed by the business provider. To be specific: (i) Each en-
tity trusts the identity manager, i.e., install the identity man-
ager’s digital certificate and is able to verify the signature di-
rectly or indirectly signed by the identity manager. (ii) Each
entity in the system has an identity name and each has been
issued a digital certificate by the designated identity manager
in advance to bind the entity’s identity name with the pub-
lic/private key pair. There can also be more than one identity
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Figure 1: DLedger’s design structure
managers in multi-party business model; in that case, cross-
certifications among the identity managers are required as
well.
An overview of the DLedger’s structure is shown in Fig-
ure 1. In a nutshell, DLedger is designed to facilitate security
solution development by recording and interlocking every
record in the system, creating and maintaining an immutable
and distributed ledger. All entities in a DLedger system, in-
cluding the identity manager, together form a peer-to-peer
(P2P) network. Each peer appends its new records into the
DLedger after making approvals to other peers’ records after
verifying their validity. The identity manager also appends
entity certificates issuance and certificate revocation records
into the ledger. At the moment, the distributed ledger stores
two types of record content:
• entity’s application records, e.g., solar energy usage
• identity management operations which include certificate
issuance and revocation.
The consensus on a record in the distributed ledger is
achieved if enough number of entities has approved this
record. The number of approvers is called the weight of a
record in DLedger.
Sharing the similar idea as the IOTA’s tangle, DLedger
stores all records in a Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG) instead
of a single blockchain. As shown in Figure 2a, each ver-
tex represents a record carrying its payload data while each
edge represents an approval made by a record to another. In
DLedger’s DAG, a newly generated record (vertex) will be
placed adjacent (chained) to n (n≥ 2) existing records in the
DAG, establishing the approvals from the new record to the
previous ones. Figure 2a shows an example of DAG when
n = 2. Tailing records are those records not approved by any
other records in the DAG.
new 
record
new 
approval
new 
approval
(a) A DAG
Record Name
Approved Record 1
Approved Record n
Record Payload
…
Proof-of-Authentication
(b) Record Format
Figure 2: DLedger DAG and Record
When a peer P generates a new record R, the peer takes
the steps as follows.
1. P randomly selects n tailing records generated by other
peers.
2. It will then verify the validity of these records and the
records directly or indirectly approved by these records.
If any of the n records is invalid, i.e. the record is ma-
licious or it approves an invalid record, P should drop it
and repick another.
3. The peer then adds the names of the n selected records
and the application payload into the new record R as
shown in Figure 2b and sets R’s name to:
“/DLedger/<Generator ID>/<Record Hash>”
where “<Generator ID>” is P’s unique ID and “<Record
Hash>” is the digest calculated over R.
4. Finally, P appends a Proof-of-Authentication (PoA) by
digitally signing the record, making its authenticity and
integrity verifiable.
The peer then utilizes the new record notification protocol
(Section 5.2) to advertise it to the whole P2P network. After
receiving the notification, other entities will fetch the record
and add it to their local ledger after authentication. There
also exists a ledger synchronization process (Section 5.3)
triggered both periodically and after out-of-sync events (e.g.,
sleeping mode, network failures, etc.). Leveraging the noti-
fication protocol and the synchronization protocol, DAG is
replicated and synchronized among all entities.
A fundamental difference that distinguishes our work
from existing solutions is the data-centric implementation
over NDN. Dissimilar to TCP/IP network, NDN make the
named and secured data as the thin waist of the network.
In NDN, an application fetches data by sending an Inter-
est packet carrying the desired data name. The network for-
wards the Interest by its name and fetches the corresponding
Data packet from its origin or an in-network cache. We elab-
4
orate the details of these two protocols and their data-centric
features in Section 5.
Interest Name
Flags and other 
Parameters
Optional Signature
Data Name
Data Content
Signature
equals or
is prefix of
Interest Packet Data Packet
Figure 3: Interest and Data packet in NDN
DLedger adopts a set of security policies for record re-
ceivers to check the incoming records, preventing potential
threats such as spam attack and collusion attack, and misbe-
having operations like laziness (contributing nothing to sys-
tem security). These security policies assures a (k,N) k < N
threshold scheme where unless more than k peers of the total
N peers get compromised, the system remains secured.
Incentives for Entities The incentive for a peer P to con-
tribute is the dependency of a record’s validity on its ap-
provals. Thus, actively approving records leads to the con-
firmation of the records P generates and benefits its data au-
thenticity, integrity, and availability. By contrast, a passive
peer may attach its records to invalid records and thus make
them rejected by the loyal majority of entities, losing guar-
antee of the data security.
The motivation of keeping one’s local ledger up-to-sync
is to get the latest status, which is important to protect its
own interest. For example, the identity manager may insert
the certificate revocation records into the distributed ledger.
Without noticing such records, an entity may wrongly ap-
prove a record signed by a revoked key, resulting in genera-
tion of abandoned records. Moreover, keeping the freshness
of the local ledger helps entities to know whether their own
records get accepted, confirmed, or abandoned by the whole
system.
4 DAG-Based DLedger with Interlocked PoA-
Verifiable Records
This section presents the detailed design of the ledger system
in terms of (i) how PoA works, (ii) how DLedger ensures the
success of recording functionality by security policies (i.e.,
contribution policy and interlock policy), and (iii) how the
system achieves consensus on the recorded data. We also
describe a mechanism for storage-constrained IoT device to
reduce required storage of the local ledger.
4.1 Proof-of-Authentication
In DLedger, instead of computing crypto puzzles or allocat-
ing other resources, entities append a PoA to the record, as-
sociating it to a specific entity, so its creator cannot refuse to
admit the existence and ownership of it. To verify a PoA, an
entity confirms:
• The public key, which the identity manager issued to the
creator, can verify the PoA.
• The record containing the key’s certificate must be con-
firmed.
• No confirmed record has revoked the certificate.
PoA is a difference enabler in our ledger design because it al-
lows the system to distinguish records generated by different
entities. As described later in this section, the interlock pol-
icy and the consensus process are all based on this attribute.
PoA provides the authenticity and integrity of the data
but does not suffice to prevent evil entities from abusing the
ledger. One reason for PoA is its lightweight. To gener-
ate numerous PoA in a short time is not difficult even for
constrained devices, given the wide usage of ECC chips like
ATECC508A in IoT. Therefore, DLedger adopts security
policies to force entities behave.
4.2 Contribution Policy
The contribution policy enforces peers to verify unconfirmed
records, to be more specific, tailing records when creating
a record. This policy enhances robustness in the following
aspects.
• Ensure the continuous verification and confirmation of
new records, preventing the escalation in the size of un-
confirmed records.
• Preventing lazy peers who approve old records and con-
tribute nothing to security.
Whenever a tailing record arrives, it is checked against the
contribution policy, e.g., after fetching a new record adver-
tised by another entity.
When a new record R approving n existing records is re-
ceived, ideally these n records should be tailing records:
∀i ∈ range(1,n) wi = 0 (1)
where wi is the weight of ith approved record. However,
network delay and concurrent approvals make it possible for
them to be no longer tailing records upon arrival. To avoid
unexpected rejections, we introduce a threshold Wcontribution
w.r.t.:
0 <Wcontribution <Wcon f irm
When verifying a new record, instead of using rule 1, the
peer checks whether it satisfies:
∀i ∈ range(1,n) wi <Wcontribution (2)
The safe choice for an entity is to randomly select n tail-
ing records to approve whenever generating a record, but in
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the case of insufficient tailing records, recent records with a
weight not exceeding Wcontribution are also allowed to select.
For any record violating the condition, unless more than
Wcon f irm entities accept it ignoring the policy, it will never
gain enough weight to be confirmed. Therefore, it forms the
(k,N), k =Wcon f irm scheme. Similar statements hold for the
other policy.
4.3 Interlock Policy
The interlock policy prevents a peer P approving records
generated by itself. In other words, no adjacent two records
should be generated by the same peer:
∀Ri,R j Ri and R j are adjacent⇒ Pi 6= Pj
Any arriving records against the condition above will be re-
jected, no matter whether it is a tailing record or not.
Similar to the contribution policy, we have the scheme
(k,N), k =Wcon f irm hold.
A
D
B
C
471c3e5 471c3e5
471c3e5
471c3e5
098c830
A
D
B
C
471c3e5
471c3e5
471c3e5
Figure 4: Modifying Records in DLedger
The interlock policy forces records from different entities
to interlock each other by approval—refering to names. As
shown in Figure 4, since each record name contains the hash
value of the block, modifying a record (record A in the fig-
ure) will void all the approvals made to it (avalanche effect
in fact). Note that these approvals are protected by PoAs,
and per the interlock policy, B, C, and D were generated by
different entities from A’s. Therefore, no one can modify a
record without knowing all other entities’ private keys.
Moreover, the interlock policy limits that any peer can
only increase the unconfirmed records’ depth by at most one,
hence eliminating the attack scenarios where a compromised
entity endlessly append new records, add to the unconfirmed
depth and burden other peers.
4.4 Consensus Through Record Weight
When an entity approves a record, it acknowledges the its
validity and the records it approved directly or indirectly un-
til reaching confirmed records. Figure 5 shows an example
of such process in case when n = 2. To be more specific,
this entity has to verify that all records involved satisfy the
following four requirements.
1. They carry valid PoAs.
2. The tailing records cannot approve a record whose weight
is too large by the contribution policy.
3. A record cannot approve another record generated by the
same entity given the interlock policy.
4. The payload carried in these records satisfy the
application-level semantics.
The first three requirements are defined by DLedger while
the last one is controlled by the application layer. A typi-
cal example of the application-level rule is that to verify a
Bitcoin transaction, peers need to trace back the transaction
history of the buyer to ensure it has enough coins for the pur-
chase. In this paper, we focus on the distributed ledger and
network solutions, leaving the application-level rules to the
specific use cases.
Confirmed 
Records
Unconfirmed 
Records
New 
Records
A
B
C
D
To approve record A and D, the entity needs to validate record A, B, C, and
D.
Figure 5: Approving the validity of existing records
The DLedger system achieves consensus through record
weight. The weight of an record is the number of entities ap-
proving it directly or indirectly, denoted by w here. A newly
generated record have a zero weight. After being advertised
and spreading across the P2P network, it gets approved ac-
companied by a cumulative increasing in its weight. Fig-
ure 6 shows a simple example. Records are categorized by
whether their weight exceed a threshold Wcon f irm into two
states:
• Unconfirmed record: w <Wcon f irm.
• Confirmed record: s≥Wcon f irm.
An eventual goal for a record is to gain enough weight to
become confirmed. If it cannot, however, it may be voided
after an application-defined period. By contrast, a confirmed
record means the system has achieved consensus on the va-
lidity of it and will permanently store it.
4.5 Reducing Storage of Local Ledger
The monotonical appending of records continues consum-
ing the space. To fit DLedger into storage-contrained IoT
devices, when the provisioned space approaches exhaustion,
an entity can reduce the size of the local DAG by (i) pruning
all the records that stay unconfirmed after a period of time,
6
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The appending of C1 increase the weight of A1 and B1 by 1. Then, the
insertion of A3 will add to the weight of C1 and A1 due to the direct and
indirect approval respectively, but not B1 because it has been already
approved by A.
Figure 6: An example of weight increase
and (ii) taking out the ancient confirmed records that are far
away from the tailing records. Regarding the ancient con-
firmed records taken out from the DAG, an entity can has
following options depending on specific use cases.
• The entity can transfer it to some storage service (e.g.,
cloud server) for backup.
• These records can be dropped if there are designated nodes
deployed by service provider to store the full copy of the
DAG. Since the records are interlocked and protected by
PoA, the service provider cannot modify the content in the
existing DAG.
• Without backup service available and designated nodes
deployed, it is still safe for the entity to drop the records
if these records are no longer useful. Taking the solar
gateway system as an example, after the service provider
bills the customer rightly, old records in each entity’s local
ledger become droppable.
Note that this process takes place at each individual entity
with no multi-party coordination.
5 DLedger over a Data-centric Network
Two basic network functions are required in DLedger: noti-
fication and synchronization, posing a big challenge to het-
erogeneous IoT networks which lack continuous connectiv-
ity. Notification enables entities to advertise new records,
while synchronization makes a node’s local state consistent
with others. An entity is not guaranteed to be always online;
a record is not guaranteed to be always accepted. Conse-
quently, a peer needs to synchronize its DAG with the P2P
network both on a timely basis and after a known failure,
such as link failure, device failure, low-power mode, etc.
This section introduces the concepts of NDN and describe
how DLedger exploits NDN protocols to facilitate data dis-
semination in an IoT network and simplifies the implemen-
tation. In particular, DLedger leverages NDN’s data-centric
features in three aspects.
• DLedger utilizes in-network caching and built-in content
multicast to improve the data transmission efficiency es-
pecially when the network is unstable.
• The wireless multicast in IoT network can benefit from
the more accurate packet suppression mechanism because
NDN provides application semantics at the network layer.
• DLedger’s implementation can be markedly simplified by
developing it over a data-centric network.
For the sake of better understanding, we use the experi-
mental solar gateway system as an example to explain the
network protocols used in DLedger. The solar gateway sys-
tem is based on a device-to-device mesh wireless network (
Figure 7a) connecting constrained solar devices with LoRa,
which is a typical network scenario in IoT. Each device in
the solar system runs the NDN protocol stack directly over
link layer protocols.
NDN
Network
(a) Wireless mesh NDN network
TCP/IP 
Network
(b) Overlaid NDN on TCP/IP
Figure 7: Two Different Approaches to DLedger’s Network
If the business system is in a large scale (wide area net-
work), another approach is to build an overlaying NDN mesh
network on top of TCP/IP architecture (Figure 7b), similar
to Internet Relay Chat (IRC) over TCP in Bitcoin. DLedger
can function as expected but cannot benefit from NDN in
such deployment, where each entity needs to maintain a list
of first-hop neighbours’ IP addresses and follow the gossip
protocol to broadcast like Bitcoin.
5.1 Named Data Networking
NDN directly uses application data name at the network
layer for routing and packet forwarding. Different from an
IP packet, neither Interest nor Data packets carry addresses.
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To deliver packets in the network, NDN leverages its state-
ful forwarding plane [29]. When receiving an Interest (e.g.,
“/DLedger/gtw-node0/f46...1ace”), NDN forwarders will
forward the packet to corresponding interface(s) by its name
and record its path—incoming interfaces and outgoing inter-
faces. When the matching Data packet arrives, forwarders
will forward it back to the requester following the reverse
path taken by the Interest. At the same time, forwarders will
cache the Data packets to satisfy potential Interests in future
targeting the same Data. Getting rid of addresses enables
more efficient data dissemination:
• In-network Caching: Routers cache Data packets to sat-
isfy future Interests,
• Interest Aggregation: Multiple Interests targeting the same
data can be aggregated into one.
Thanks to these two features, NDN naturally supports con-
tent multicast.
To serve data under a specific prefix (e.g., “/DLedger”),
a node will need to register this name prefix to the net-
work showing its willing to receive such Interest packets. In
DLedger, each entity will register two name prefixes to the
network for the wireless interface to receive Interest packets:
• Prefix “/DLedger” to receive multicast Interests.
• Prefix “/DLedger/<entity’s name>” to receive unicast
Interests, where “<entity’s name>” is unique per entity.
To work with data-centric data dissemination, NDN re-
quires data producers to sign each Data packet on creation
and encrypt its content if needed. Therefore, Data pack-
ets are secured directly during transmission and storage on
untrusted servers. This method fundamentally differs from
today’s TLS [26] or QUIC [16], which only protect point-to-
point connections. Using public keys certified by designated
identity managers, a node in NDN can ensure data integrity
and verify producers’ authority through trust chain. Encryp-
tion, on the other hand, ensures confidentiality of Data pack-
ets.
Building over NDN’s Interest and Data packet exchange,
DLedger directly uses an NDN Data packet as a record,
thus getting rid of the encapsulation overhead. As shown
in Figure 3 and Figure 2b, record names are Data names,
approved records and payload fields are Data contents,
and PoAs are Data signatures. Especially, a record
is structurally named “/DLedger/<Generator ID>/<Record
hash>”, with the first two conponents revealing where
to fetch it. In the solar network example, the record
“/Dledger/gtw-device0/f46...1ace” is created by the en-
tity “/DLedger/gtw-device0”. Hence, packet wrapping and
network functions are supported by NDN, vastly simplifying
DLedger’s implementation.
5.2 Notification Protocol
After generating a record, to notify other peers to fetch it ,
a peer advertises it via a Notification Interest (Notif Interest)
with name
“/DLedger/NOTIF/<Generator ID>/<Record hash>”
Triggered by this Interest, a peer can simply drop the “NOTIF”
component to compose an Interest for the new record and
fetch the new record from the network.
To prevent potential denial-of-service attack and reflec-
tion attack by abusing the Notif Interest, the business ser-
vice provider may require each entity to carry the PoA of
the new record when multicasting the Notif Interest. Since
PoA is calculated over the record name, it is sufficient for a
Notif Interest receiver to verify this PoA by recovering the
record name from the Notif Interest name (by dropping the
“NOTIF” component). Embedding PoA in the Notif Interest
will not lead to extra overhead because with PoA already be-
ing verified when receiving Notif Interest, there is no need
for an entity to double verify the PoA after fetching the ac-
tual record Data packet. Instead, an entity only needs to en-
sure the record matches the name and the PoA carried in the
previous Notif Interest.
5.3 Synchronization Protocol
In DLedger, an entity triggers a synchronization process by
multicasting a Sync Interest to its neighbors. The Sync In-
terest carries the list of tailing records in the node’s current
view of local ledger as the Interest parameter [22] with the
following naming convention:
“/DLedger/SYNC/<tailing records digest>”
When another node receives a Sync Interest Isync, it com-
pares the list in Isync with its local list of tailing records, fig-
uring out whether the local ledger or the sender’s ledger is
out-of-date. If there exist tailing records missing locally, for
every missing record, it sends an Interest to fetch it. The an-
cestor records approved by retrieved records will also be re-
cursively checked and fetched. On the other hand, if a record
in Isync is no longer a tailing record in its local ledger, it will
send out an Sync Interest declaring the sender’s ledger is out-
of-sync.
Thanks to DAG, synchronization is able to merge multiple
ledgers seamlessly after recovering from a network partition.
Instead of leading to forks when using blockchain, aggrega-
tions in DLedger exposes no conflicts. Once synchronized,
an entity is allowed to create a record approving the existing
records from multiple branches formed by different subnets,
thus merging multiple branches together.
Note that the contribution policy won’t block the synchro-
nization process because it only applies to tailing record, but
the interlock policy will still apply. If a record fetched during
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the synchronization made a self-approval, this record will not
be approved by good peers in the future.
5.4 Efficient Data Dissemination in DLedger:
A Case Study
We illustrate how NDN can help DLedger achieve efficient
data dissemination in heterogeneous IoT network using the
notification process and record fetching process as examples.
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G
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B
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E
(a) Notification Interest
Record Fetching
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G
C A
B
D
R
E
(b) Record Fetching
Figure 8: Notification and Record Fetching
As shown in Figure 8a, after the record generator A mul-
ticasts the Notif Interest to its first-hop neighbors B, C, and
D, they will relay the multicast to the further node E. Du-
plicated Interests are suppressed here, i.e., if B or D hear the
same Notif Interest multicasted by C, they can avoid send-
ing the packet again. This feature is absent in the muticast
solutions based on IP or other network protocols (e.g., Zig-
bee, Thread, etc.), because B, C, or D cannot recognize the
content carried in the multicast packet at the network layer.
When entities hear a notification, they will send Interests
for the same Data in a short time, thus those Interests can be
aggregated by the intermediate nodes and the replied Data
can be cached to satisfy future Interests, saving the network
bandwidth. For example, as shown in Figure 8b, assuming
C has the new record, when F and G wants to fetch it, their
two Interests can be merged at E and satisfied by the content
store of C instead of A.
Interests can be retransmitted in case of intermittent con-
nectivity or packet loss. For example, when C is returning
the record to F and G, the link between E and F , G becomes
unavailable. Then, when the connectivity recovers, F and
G can retransmit the fetching Interest and get Data from the
cache on E even though E is only a forwarder without run-
ning the ledger.
6 Security Assessment of DLedger System
This section presents the security assessment of DLedger in
terms of its security attributes and how our design can miti-
gate various attack scenarios and potential vulnerabilities.
6.1 Security Attributes
Table 1: Security Attributes of DLedger
Security Attribute DLedger’s Approach
Availability
Decentralized replication of the
ledger
Integrity
PoA makes confirmed records
immutable
Authenticity
PoA with all the issued/revoked
certificates appended in the dis-
tributed ledger
Confidentiality
Encrypted Content which is in-
visible to non-peers entities
Table 1 summarizes the security attributes provided and
briefly explains DLedger’s methodology. DLedger provides
the first three security attributes by the distributed ledger and
PoA.
Hiding entities’ identities using pseudonymity is not the
main consideration in the design of DLedger. First, DLedger
is designed for private business network where the identity
manager, or the business service provider, has the knowledge
of their customers’ identities. Second, different from the
pseudonymity in Bitcoin where miners are anonymous (i.e.,
hide behind the arbitrary wallet addresses), an entity and all
its records are associated with its PoA. Moreover, as pointed
by many works [25, 19], in Bitcoin and other cryptocurrency
systems, pseudonomity can be easily compromised when at-
tackers can combine off-network information with the open-
ness of transactions.
However, since the use case is private business systems,
internal records should not be exposed to the public Internet.
To protect data from leakage to the external network, entities
can encrypt the content. This requires the deployment of
proper key management and access control. We argue that
this is relatively easy in a private business model where the
trust relationships among system entities have already been
established. For example, DLedger can utilize name-based
access control (NAC) [34], where the identity manager can
serve as the decryption key distributor who grants the access
rights to internal entities only.
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6.2 Threats Mitigation
6.2.1 Laziness
DLedger utilizes its security policies to demotivate peers
from being lazy. For example, if a peer approves records
that have already been confirmed, other peers will abandon
them by the contribution policy. Since certificate revocations
are also appended to ledger, it is important for all peers to
synchronize, get up-to-date security information, and avoid
approving a revoked peer’s records.
6.2.2 Spam Record Attack
PoA is efficient even for constrained devices, enabling a ma-
licious node to fabricate spam records with a valid PoA.
Such spam attack could abuse the system by indefinitely
increasing the unconfirmed records (i.e., the hops from a
tailing record to a confirmed record) and exploiting legit
peers’ resources for verification and storage. It will also in-
crease the network overhead and induce latency into the net-
work. DLedger prevents such abuse from its design because
(i) With PoA revealing the creator’s identity, the attacker will
leave its footprints when attacking. (ii) The interlock pol-
icy prevents an attacker adding the unconfirmed depth by
approving itself. Moreover, application level semantics can
help mitigate the abuse. For example, a node could measure
the rate of incoming Notification Interests from each peer to
detect malicious nodes, and then report them to the service
provider for further examination.
6.2.3 Denial-of-Service Attack and Reflection Attack
Since a Notif Interest will trigger system entities to send
packets towards “/DLedger/Generator ID/<Record hash>”
without protection, misbehaving entities or external attack-
ers may abuse this Interest for denial-of-service attack and
reflection attack by forging nonexistent “<Generator ID>”
and “<Record hash>” or using a victim’s “<Generator ID>”.
As mentioned in Section 5.2, the system can force each
entity to append its PoA into Notif Interests. In this way, if
the PoA is unverifiable or mismatches with the generator’s
name, the receiver should reject the Interest. A peer can also
report such Interests to an intrusion detection system (IDS)
if the business provider deployed one.
6.2.4 Collusion Attack
The collusion attack is possible when multiple entities in the
P2P system want to maximize their benefits through approv-
ing and validating each other’s invalid records. PoA can only
ensure data authenticity but not prevent a malicious entity
from abusing its approvals. And neither the interlock policy
nor the contribution policy can stop colluded peers collabo-
rating.
DLedger prevents the collusion attack to the extent that
unless Wcon f irm or more entities collude, the attack cannot
succeed. Particularly, a record needs to have an weight of at
least Wcon f irm to be confirmed. Thus, faked records cannot
get the system’s consensus on their validities as far as the
number of colluded peers do not exceed Wcon f irm.
6.2.5 Identity Manager’s Bot Attack
All the peers in DLedger trust designated identity managers
and certificates they issue. These designated identity man-
agers might show a malicious behavior by spinning many
virtual nodes and assigning them valid identity certificates.
In this way, these virtual nodes can easily confirm invalid
records by making Wcon f irm virtual nodes to approve them.
However, DLedger’s security by publicity prevents an
identity manager from abusing its authority. As noted in sec-
tion 4.1, identity managers must issue certificates by append-
ing them into the ledger system. This mechanism required all
interventions from identity managers to be recorded, allow-
ing later examination if suspicious approvals are identified.
6.2.6 Light Node Vulnerability
In distributed ledger systems, light nodes themselves don’t
verify blocks or store a copy of the ledger, but rather out-
source it to full nodes, causing severe security vulnerabili-
ties. Taking BitCoin’s light node [3] as an example: light
nodes rely on full node to validate the transactions; conse-
quently, without the help of full node, it accepts fake or in-
valid coins, resulting in this node’s bankruptcy. Even worse,
a light node has no privacy because it sends the wallet ad-
dress to and receives the balance and transaction history from
the full node it depends.
DLedger mitigates this vulnerability by making it easier
for every entity to “mine” new records and preserve a lo-
cal ledger. Here, PoA is lightweight even for constraint IoT
devices, thus encouraging entities to perform their own com-
putations rather than leasing out. Also, DLedger’s decentral-
ized archiving mechanism as described in Section 4.5 allows
efficient use of storage capacity without loss of any required
ledger data. NDN, as the underlying network, also helps to
address the challenge because any record can be retrieved
from any node rather than some specific full nodes, without
revealing the identity of the requester.
7 Evaluation of DLedger
In this section, we evaluate DLedger’s robustness, scalabil-
ity, and ability of handling network partition through the the-
ory analysis and our simulation results over ndnSIM [18], an
NS-3 based simulation platform for NDN.
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7.1 The Unconfirmed Records Size
An essential concern of DLedger is its robustness: as system
runs, will the size of unconfirmed records go infinitely large
resulting in the system crash? As proved in Appendix A.1,
the tailing record size is concentrated around the constant:
nλT
n−1
where T is the average latency for a new record to be ac-
cepted by the system and λ is the new record generation
rate of the system following a Poisson distribution. More-
over, Appendix A.2 shows that the time for a record being
confirmed is also a constant value. Therefore, since both
the frontier (tailing record) and the depth (time to be con-
firmed) of DAG’s unconfirmed records keep constant, the
unconfirmed record size is also a constant value.
We evaluate DLedger by the simulation in terms of the un-
confirmed record size as the DAG grows. To be specific, we
set up a 50 entities P2P network with Wcon f irm = 20, where
each entity’s record generation rate is 0.2 records/sec. As
shown in the Figure 9, the unconfirmed record number will
not increase with the DAG’s growth. Instead, the uncon-
firmed record number line will increase for a short time after
bootstrapping, and then fluctuate around a constant value,
confirming the mathematics proof.
Simulation Settings: 50 entities P2P network with Wcon f irm = 20. Each
entity generates a new record every 5 seconds.
Figure 9: Unconfirmed Records As DAG Grows
The Figure 10 reveals the relationship between the
Wcon f irm setting and the unconfirmed record size when the
total entity number is the same: by adjusting the Wcon f irm
from 5 to 20, the unconfirmed record size will increase by
only about 100%.
7.2 System Scalability
We argue that DLedger has better scalability because of the
following two reasons. First, DLedger leverages DAG to
keep the records. Instead of allowing only one successful
Simulation Settings: 50 entities P2P network with Wcon f irm = 5 and
Wcon f irm = 20. Each entity generates a new record every 5 seconds.
Figure 10: The Unconfirmed Records With Different Weight
next block in the blockchain, DLedger accept multiple valid
next records, thus allowing multiple entities contributing to
the system in parallel. This gets rid of the computation waste
and frees the limit on record processing speed. Second, PoA
is used as the gating function. Unlike PoW which is highly
CPU bound, PoA is much cheaper and efficient even for
constrained IoT devices, greatly improving the system ef-
ficiency.
Simulation Settings: Wcon f irm = 5 with total entity number 10, 25, and 50.
Figure 11: Unconfirmed Records As DAG Grows
We also show DLedger’s performance when the number of
entities grows. As shown in Figure 11, with fixed Wcon f irm,
the more entities participate, the faster a record will be con-
firmed. Because for any specific record, more entities means
more efforts on approving it.
7.3 Network Partition
We evaluate DLedger’s performance in the case of network
partition: in the simulation, we split the network into two in-
dependent subnets by taking down the links between them.
The partition takes 100 seconds and two networks unit again
after that. Figure 12 shows a DAG maintained by an en-
tity at the end of the simulation. As shown, two branches
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This shows a DAG from the simulation. Each circle in the figure is a
record. The links among records are the approvals. The recent records are
higher in the DAG as shown in the figure.
Simulation Settings: 15 entities P2P network. The partition takes place at
second 20, dividing the network into a 7-node subnet and a 8-node subnet.
Two networks rejoin at 80 seconds.
Figure 12: Unconfirmed Records As DAG Grows
have formed and then merged, showing DLedger’s ability
to recover from the network partition, eventually confirming
records from each subnet.
8 Discussion
8.1 System Bootstrapping
The business service provider should bootstrap DLedger for
entities to use. The service provider needs to generate the
first several records as the genesis records for later records to
approve. System constants, such as Econ f irm and Econtribute,
should also be properly configured. These configurations can
be dynamically tuned via software updates, which can be de-
livered through records in DLedger. After the bootstrapping,
the identity manager can go offline unless when new entities
join or certificate revocation operations are needed.
To join the DLedger P2P network, a new entity should
have a certificate issued by the identity manager. The is-
suance is done by inserting a record into DLedger, making
other peers aware. Then the new entity can start working
with a synchronization.
8.2 PoA v.s. Other Consensus Algorithm
Compared with the consensus algorithms used and proposed
by other distributed ledger systems, PoA is not like a con-
sensus algorithm. Actually, PoA only associates an entity’s
public identity with the records it generates and ensures the
data integrity. This explains why PoA is much cheaper than
any other consensus algorithms. In DLedger, the consensus
on a confirmed record is achieved by relying on enough num-
ber of different entities to approve it, where PoA plays a key
role to distinguish how many different entities have approved
that record.
This is also the fundamental difference between IOTA and
DLedger. In IOTA, the miner is anonymous and thus enough
approvals do not necessarily mean enough number of entities
in the system recognize the validity of a record.
Another notable difference between PoA and other con-
sensus algorithms is that PoA requires the identity managers
to certify the peers in the system. This prerequisite decides
that DLedger is suitable for private business systems such as
bank accounting, medical records and power grid systems,
but not for public network systems. The comparison between
PoA and other consensus algorithms is shown in the Table 2.
8.3 Record Snapshot
Section 4.5 presents the mechanism for an entity to reduce
the size of its local ledger. In this section, we discuss an-
other mechanism called record snapshot when the data from
multiple records is aggregatable and thus can be summa-
rized into one record. For example, in the solar gateway net-
work, the records keep each entity’s residential power pro-
duction/consumption to get the power balance. In this case,
a snapshot process can be performed by calculating the even-
tual balance for each entity using the confirmed records so
that these confirmed records can be dropped to save space.
Note that taking snapshot is an individual behavior without
needing to synchronize snapshot records with other peers.
8.4 Ledger Records For Cert Revocation
Besides application records inserted, as mentioned, DLedger
also keeps the issuance and revocation of certificates. This
section illustrates how to revoke a certificate.
When an intrusion such as spam attack is detected, the
identity manager may revoke the certificate of the malicious
node by signing a notice of revocation and attaching it to
DLedger. Similar to generating regular records, the identity
manager needs to verify n existing records and multicast a
notification to the whole P2P network.
To facilitate querying the revocation status, the overlay
pointers can be applied. For example, as shown in figure 13,
R1 and R2 are DLedger records carrying notices of revoca-
tion. Besides approvals, they also have an application-level
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Table 2: Comparison Between PoA and Other Consensus Algorithms
Gating Function Consensus IoT Friendly Identity Management Applied Scenarios
Proof-of-Work Yes No Not needed Public System
Proof-of-Stack Yes No Not needed Public System
Proof-of-Space Yes No Not needed Public System
Proof-of-Activity Yes No Not needed Public System
Proof-of-Assignment* Yes Yes Needed Public System
Proof-of-Authentication (PoA) Work with Weight Yes Needed Private System
*: As discussed in Section 2.2, Proof-of-Assignment subjects to single-point-of-failure and attack scenario where attackers can hire mild computation power.
R0
R1
R2
Figure 13: Attaching Notice of Revocation
pointer to the previous revocation in the payload, accelerat-
ing search for revocation. In the example, nodes only need
to maintain the last revocation record R2 and use it to follow
back to all revocations.
8.5 Other Use Cases of DLedger
The DLedger design shown in the paper serves two differ-
ent use cases: (i) application record ledger and (ii) identity
manager’s certificate management.
The DLedger can also be used to facilitate IoT systems in
terms of configurations and information sharing. As a sim-
ple example, when building DLedger over TCP/IP network-
ing, the system needs to maintain the mapping between NDN
name prefixes and IP addresses. Similar to how Bitcoin’s
IRC overlay maintains neighbors’ IP addresses, DLedger can
be utilized here. For example, when an entity joins the P2P
network, it can insert a record containing its address. When-
ever its IP address changes, it appends a record containing a
pointer to obsolete the stale record.
9 Conclusion
We present DLedger, a distributed ledger system, to satisfy
the need for IoT-friendly ledger in private business scenar-
ios. Utilizing DAG and PoA, even constrained devices can
engage by “mining” their own records and getting them con-
firmed, which enhances data availability, integrity and au-
thenticity. Building over NDN further enables effective data
dissemination in unstable IoT networks and simplifies im-
plementation.
Through designing DLedger, we want to prove the power
of distributed ledgers differently from existing solutions.
That is, instead of combining data openness with anonymity
or pseudonomity, DLedger exploits verifiable identities
known within the private system, offering an explicit way to
measure the validity of a record by the number of approvers.
Associating records with their generators also push entities
into behaving good by recording the footprints of attackers.
Hence, even with great authority, the service provider can-
not freely add bots because the certificates of them will be
public to the whole system. It is such a reconsideration on
the methodology that simplifies the achievement of security,
without hurting IoT-friendliness and efficiency.
A DLedger’s Robustness Math Proof
A.1 Constant Tailing Record Size
We assume that at any time t, the tailing record size g(t)
in DAG remains stable and we assume g(t) is concentrated
around the constant C. In DLedger, we let the entities’ record
appending to be a Poisson process with a rate λ . We also
consider the network latency in the system: after a record
being created at time t, it takes T time to be visible to the
entire system (at time t +T ).
In our proof, we let all the entities in the system behave
as expected, i.e., each entity randomly select n existing tail-
ing records out of total from C tailing records from their lo-
cal DAG to approve when creating a new record. However,
at any time, since there are λT tailing records that are still
not visible, by the assumption, there should also be approx-
imately λT tailing records becoming approved. Therefore,
from the system perspective, the number of nodes which re-
main tailing records is actually C−λh. Hence, the probabil-
ity of an approved record being tailing record is:
C−λT
C
By the stationarity assumption of the tailing record size,
we have
λT = nλT
C−λT
C
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Solving the equation, we have:
C =
nλT
n−1
A.2 The Confirmation Time
Assume there are totally N entities in the system. Let
f (Wcon f irm,y) denote the expected approvals for a node
whose weight is y to be confirmed (w = Wcon f irm). That
is, on average, a record whose w = y still needs to be
further approved by f (Wcon f irm,y) approvals to satisfy the
weight condition and get confirmed. Obviously, we have
f (Wcon f irm,Wcon f irm) = 0 and f (Wcon f irm,0) is the total re-
quired number of approvals for a record to be confirmed.
For a record with w = y, the probability of a new approval
contributing to the weight is N−yN and
y
N on the contrary,
which results in the equation:
f (Wcon f irm,y) =
f (Wcon f irm,y)
y
N
+ f (Wcon f irm,y+1)
N− y
N
+1
By solving the equation, we can get
f (Wcon f irm,0) = N
Wcon f irm−1
∑
i=0
1
N− i
which is the expectation of approval number for a record to
be confirmed.
Since the tailing record number is constant around C and
for each node, it takes a constant number of approvals to get
confirmed. Because an entity randomly selects the existing
tailing records to approve when generating a new record, the
time for a record to get f (Wcon f irm,0) number of approvals
should also be a constant value.
We can get the upper bound of the confirmation time by
the fact that for any unconfirmed node there are two cases:
either it is a tailing record, or there exists at least one tailing
record which approves it directly or indirectly. Given the
average time for a tailing record to be approved is:
tapproved = T +
C
nλ
=
n
n−1T
the expected time for a new node to be confirmed is less than
tcon f irm ≤ f (Wcon f irm,0)× tapproval
=
T Nn
n−1
Wcon f irm−1
∑
i=0
1
N− i
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